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A great deal of controversy has arisen with regard to
the practice of marginal cost pricing as a public sector
policy to achieve efficient resource allocation. It is
important to present the different aspects of this very
complex problem together to establish a more clarified
aggregate picture.
Marginal cost pricing is faced with three main sources
of problems:
1. That of measurement, due to both theoretical and
practical difficulties in establishing cost,
2. That of determination of social welfare, a very
complex task involving not only economic factors but also
those of politics, psychology, sociology and hence not
easily justified in a clear-cut manner,
3. That of income redistribution, which generally
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aI. INTRODUCTION
In public economics, the question of how government
ctivities should be managed so as to achieve the efficient
use of the limited resources available is one of major
interest
.
Many economists, especially welfare economists, have
examined this problem, trying to find an answer to the
question: "What pricing policy should public enterprises
adopt?"
Successes as well as frustrations of various degrees
have been experienced. It is recognized that the problem is
directly associated with the social welfare area, the objec-
tive being to maximize social welfare. Thus it is a very
complex problem, since social welfare determination is
ultimately an ethical judgement in the context of an infinite
number of possible conbinations among various factors such as
politics, sociology, psychology and economics.
A completely satisfactory answer in this context is not
possible and much debate has arisen which tends to confuse
the issue. Furthermore, exactly because of its complexity
that the available literature consists of articles, each
dealing with some of its special aspects only. Hence it is
hard to form a consistent aggregate picture of the situation.
This thesis is an attempt to establish this aggregate
picture and along the way to pin down the limits and

difficulties associated with the problem of resource allo-
cation faced by public enterprises.
Section II develops the social welfare concept to
establish the context in which social welfare is used by
economists in their analyses of the public sector behavior
Section III shows the implication of social welfare on
the desired behavior for the economy and the context in
which this behavior is possible.
Section IV summarizes the different approaches to the
analysis of the public enterprise's behavior.
Section V discusses the implications of the marginal
cost pricing behavior, the related difficulties and an
assessment of this pricing pDlicy as compared with others.

II. WELFARE ECONOMICS
Scarcity of resources requires an efficient allocation
in their use.
What do we mean by making the best use of the resources?
Presumably, resources are being used to satisfy our need,
to serve our well-being. Conceptually then, on the national
level, efficient allocation of resources would be related to
the achievement of maximum social welfare subject to their
scarcity
.
One has to face, immediately, with the problem of what
constitutes social welfare and how different states of
welfare can be ranked.
On this question, Mrs. Ruggles (Ref. 1) gave us a
rather useful review on the development of welfare economics
from the so called "old" to "new" welfare views.
Basically, it is recognized that social welfare is some
amalgam of the welfares of the constituent members of the
population, who in the words of Mishan (Ref. 2) are assumed
to be "rational" and "responsible" beings.
Rational in two senses:
-That the choices made by each individual in any
situation are consistent with his other choices. (Thus an
individual "welfare" is reflected through his choice when he
has the freedom to do so).

-That the well-being of the individual depends only
on his own real income and not at all on those of the others.
Responsible in that each individual is taken to be the
best judge of his own wants.
Clearly, both senses of "rational" are simplifications
which may or may not be true, while individual responsibility
is an ethical judgement (unless the individual always knows
with certainty what is best for him).
Note also that in specifying his choice, the individual
needs only rank his preferences, thus individual welfare
(or utility) is ordinal in nature.
How are individual welfares taken into account in the
realm of social welfare?
Earlier welfare economists, while recognizing the
problem of making interpersonal comparisons of utilities,
argued that it is necessary to do so if economic analysis is
to be significant. Bentham went as far as to propose the
sum total of happiness as a measure of social welfare which
involved treating everybody equally and also that utilities
are in fact additive (thus utilities have to be cardinal in
nature). Wicksell argued that a rich man carries his con-
sumption so far that the marginal utility of the last unit
consumed is little or nothing to him while the poor man
must discontinue his consumption on practically every
commodity at a point where they still represent for him a
very high marginal utility. Thus an exchange of income
between the rich man and the poor man might lead to a much

greater total sum of utility among them. This statement
clearly implies an interpersonal comparison of utilities
had been made. Samuelson's social welfare function is a
mathematical statement of the same thing, which would
describe a social indifference map over the individual wel-
fares, an analogy to an individual indifference map over the
commodities consumed. Social welfare ranking, in this
ultimate meaning, is so specific as to contain a high degree
of arbitrariness in the sense that there is no definite and
unique way of expressing the social welfare function in the
context of the total economy and the individuals in it.
It was Arrow (Ref. 3) who tackled the proposition that:
"If we exclude universal social rankings based upon inter-
personal comparisons of utility and rankings of the dictator-
ial variety, is it possible to construct a universal social
ranking rule that is consistent with the fundamental ethical
postulate while taking into account of individual social
rankings?"
To this proposition Arrow has provided a very interesting
proof in his famous Theorem of Possibility.
Essentially, he set out by characterising that the
universal social ranking rule possesses the three fundamental
properties of ordering - namely completeness, reflexivity
and transitivity -, that there be no imposed or dictated
preference, that individual preference should be taken into
account but no interpersonal comparison is allowed. Can
such a rule exist? From these assumed properties Arrow
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demonstrated that the resulting social ranking would reflect
the preference of a group, called the decisive group, that
any decisive group will contain an even smaller one which is
decisive. The argument thus lead to a single individual
whose preference will be reflected by the postulated social
ranking rule, which then implies dictatorship, which is a
contradiction
.
Hence Arrow's Theorem of Possibility asserts that if
rules based upon interpersonal comparisons of utility are
excluded, as are dictatorship rules, then there is no well-
behaved universal social welfare ranking rule (i.e.
satisfying the assumed properties).
Implicit in the condition that no interpersonal compari-
sons be allowed is the fact that individual intensity of
preference will not count. Hilbreth objected to this less-
appealing aspect of the rule, but in the context of the
general nature specified by Arrow for the social ranking
rule, this is inevitable.
It is thus recognized that one can only hope to reduce
the ambiguity in the social welfare ranking rule by using
those which are weaker and less specific. One such type is
the well-known Pareto ranking rule, also referred to as
a partial ranking as contrasted with the complete ranking
discussed in connection with the Arrow possibility theorem.
Essentially the Pareto ranking rule states that in
1 2going from state Z to Z
,
the social welfare is inc reased
if some individuals are made better-off and none worse-off.

Diagrammat ically , the Pareto ranking rule can be
presented as in Figure 1, where OAB represents the set of
possible states of welfare distribution for a two-individual
society (this assumption is made only for ease of graphical
presentation). Any state on the curve AB is considered
Pareto optimum since there is nb way of increasing U
without decreasing U and vice versa. No two Pareto
optimum states are comparable in the Pareto sense (unless
one is prepared to make interpersonal comparisons of
utility, i.e. making the ethical judgement in the sense of
Samuelson's social welfare function). Any state inside the
shaded area PRS is considered as an improvement of P. Now
consider C and P; nothing can be said about them in the
Paretian sense except that P, being a Paretian non-optimum,
can be improved upon. They are non-comparable except in the
ultimate sense of the social welfare function type of
judgement in which case anything can happen - C may be
better or worse than P.
This Pareto ranking rule, although greatly reducing the
amount of ambiguity associated with ethical judgement, suffers
in that it is infrequent that real situations occur in the
way that this rule can be used, i.e. some are better-off and
none worse-off . More likely there would be some gainers
and some losers. Attempts have been made to find other
criteria for social ranking that would allow judgement to be
made on these situations. The one such well-known criterion






According to this principle a change should be made if
the amount of "income" that the gainers are willing to pay
for the change to be carried out exceeds the amount that the
losers would be willing to receive to accept the change. In
other words, if the change could be made so that someone is
better-off and none worse-off. In this sense, the new
position is a potential improvement. Thus Hicks-Kaldor
avoided the necessity of making interpersonal comparisons of
utility by contemplating a transfer of income and comparing
the resulting welfare distribution.
Kaldor (Ref. 4) maintained that the transfer need not be
made since if this is the case, we are brought back to the
situation where the Pareto rule could be applied readily.
The compensation principle would then be superfluous.
It may be objected that suppose the change results in
one rich person becoming very rich and many poor people
becoming very poor, however if a transfer of income is
possible then everyone could be made either better off or
not worse-off, the compensation principle would approve the
change even though the transfer is not made - a decision
which does not appear reasonable. This objection can be
justifiable only if interpersonal comparisons of utility
are made, namely those between the rich and the poor. But
this is exactly the type of action that the compensation
principle or the Pareto ranking rule do not want to include,
and in the light of this ultimate judgement, described by a
social welfare function, even a Pareto move does not guarantee
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a more favorable solution than a non-Pareto move. Figure 2
shows that, with the assumed community indifference map, the
Paretian move PB does not attain as high a welfare state as
does the non-Paretian move PA.
The real trouble with the compensation principle was
pointed out by Scitovsky (Ref. 5) who showed that the
compensation principle has introduced sufficient ambiguity
that the use of it sometimes can lead to a contradiction.
To prevent this from happening, he suggested that a backward
test should also be satisfied. Thus the change should be
made only if:
1. The amount that the gainers are willing to pay for
the change to be carried out is more than sufficient to
compensate the losers.
2. The would be losers cannot "bribe" the would be
gainers from not wanting the change.
Scitovsky' s findings essentially can be illustrated by
Figure 3a and Figure 3b where, for simplicity of the
graphical presenta'tion, only a two-commodity two-person
economy is considered.
Figure 3a represents two aggregate economy states and
their corresponding utility frontiers OQ and OP, which are
redrawn in Figure 3b as QQ and PP respectively. Suppose the
economy is originally in the Q aggregate state with the
welfare distribution at A. Now a change is possible which
would bring the economy to the P aggregate state with the









in the new welfare distribution at B' superior to A and
thus the compensation principle would recommend that the
change be made. However, Scitovsky rightly pointed out that
it was possible that the "would be" losers could bribe the
"would be" gainers and brought the welfare distribution
from A to A', superior to B. Thus the criterion used by
the compensation principle could lead to an ambiguous situa-
tion when the backward test failed.
The forward and backward tests form the Scitovsky'
s
criteria. Unfortunately, it may be possible that even when
the Scitovsky' s criteria are met, its use can still lead us
to logical inconsistency.
Figure 4 illustrates the point where it can be seen that,
by the Scitovsky' s criteria, A is superior to A.,
,
A~ to A ? ,
A to A . By the transitive property of logic we would have
A being superior to A . However the Scitovsky' s rule would
say that A_ is superior to A , hence the inconsistency of14'
logic
.
Thus the Scitovsky' s criteria and, for that matter, the
compensation principle cannot be used alone as a guide to
policy without the risk of possible contradiction.
Furthermore, even in the sense of being potentially
superior the Scitovsky' s rule can still lead to ambiguity.
Figure 5 shows that B is potentially superior to A under
the Scitovsky' s rule, but the associated aggregate state of
the economy P is not unambiguously potentially superior to Q
since the Scitovsky' s rule would say the reverse if B' and A'









To remove this possible ambiguity, Samuelson (Ref. 6)
proposed that the change, to be superior, should be such that
the utility possibility curve, derived fron the resulting
aggregate state of the economy, lies everywhere outside that
derived from the initial aggregate state of the economy.
Figure 6 illustrates the situation. Equivalent ly, Samuelson'
s
criteria is such that the change is unambiguously potentially
superior only if the resulting aggregate economy has more in
some commodities and none less in other commodities. It is
only potentially superior in that one cannot say anything
about A and B in Figure 6 due to the distributional question.
In summary, with respect to providing a relatively
unambiguous criterion for judging the social welfare which
can be used as some guidance toward developing a policy for
efficient resourse allocation, it appears that we will have
to be satisfied with Pareto or Samuelson criteria whenever
the situation allows.
The Pareto rule, when possible, will offer unambiguous! y
actual improvement, whereas the Samuelson rule will offer
only unambiguously potential improvement. The trade-off is
that a wider class of economy states can be judged using the
latter criterion.
These criteria exclude interpersonal comparisons of
utility, the role of politics, psychology, sociology, etc.
These factors will eventually have to be taken into account-
by those charged with responsibility over the social welfare,






this ultimate judgement, the fact that Paretian optimum or
Samuelsonian optimum conditions have been achieved in no way
guarantees a favorable verdict.
However, this is not to say that Pareto or Samuelson
criteria are no better than any arbitrary criteria. It is
seen from the above discussion that the use of these two
criteria will lead to the states of economy where one
commodity or one individual welfare would attain the highest
possible level, given the levels of others. Mishan called
these states the lower levels of optima. In his words, to
sum up the discussion, "...Though the top of the edifice,
the complete optimum, has been shown to be illusory, the
lower levels of optima are fairly substantial..."
21

Ill; PA RETO OPTIMUM CONDITIONS
The discussion on welfare economics leads us to the
Samuelson and Pareto criteria which imply that, for the
study of optimum conditions, we have to look at "efficient"
production and exchange.
Millward' s (Ref. 7) approach has been used in this
presentation.
Assume an economy of n goods; the input goods will be
negative and the output goods positive. There are v




where x . is the amount of the j good produced or used
by producer a. The production functions are continuously
differentiable.
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where X . is the given aggregate level of the j good
produced or consumed in the economy.
Assuming the second order conditions to be satisfied, the
first order conditions would lead to:
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F k F h , k = i,...,n
where p& _ 3^
-If k is input and j output, then (l) says that the
marginal product of k in terms of j should be the same for
all firms using k to produce j. Clearly if this does not
hold then X. can be increased by reallocating X, among firms.
-If both are inputs then (l) says that the relative
marginal productivity of any two given factors should be the
same for every firm.
-If both are outputs then (l) says that the marginal
cost of j in terms of k should be the same for oil firms.
The first order conditions, together with the constraints,
can be used to solve for X in terms of the assumed levels
of the X.'s. If the assumed levels of X. 's are changed, then
D J
X would take different values. Tne result would be described
by a social transformation function denoted as:
F (Xt .-...Xn) = O . (2)
If the inputs are fixed (e.g. the time period considered
is short enough so that resources can be considered as
inelastic) then (2) describes a production frontier surface
in the output space.
In the exchange problem, we assume there are m indivi-
duals, each having a utility function of the form:
lT = v* oi ,..,<)
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where x\ is the amount of the j good consumed (if positive)
th
or supplied (if negative) by the i individual. The utility
functions are assumed continuously differ entiable.
Then efficient exchange can be mathematically formalized
as: .
Max U 1 (x*,...,x*)
bject to:
- n i- i.
vUxi... •,x*) = u" 1 i -.1,
.«
,m
Again assuming the second order conditions are satisfied,
the first order conditions lead to:
Uj Uj
,
. i,s s i
,
(3)
Uk Ul i' k "*> n
where , i 9 (J v
~ 2*1
-If j, k are both consumed goods then (3) says that
the marginal subjective rate of substitution between j and
k (in consumption) is the same for all individuals.
-If j, k are both supplied goods then (3) says that
the marginal rate of substitution between factors supplied
is the same for all individuals.
-If j is supplied while k is consumed then (3) says
that the willingness to supply j in exchange for the
consumption of k is the same for everyone at the margin.
Similarly, the first order conditions, together with
the constraints, will give us a relation:
H (u 1 u
m
) - o. <>
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which describes possible utilities distribution as related
to aggregates of outputs and inputs. In the utility space
it represents a utility-possibility surface.
The efficient production and exchange conditions can be
related to each other by formulating the following problem:
subject to
Max U4 (xJ,...,xtL)
F ( Xi , . . . , Xa ) ; o
-U*(x*
,
. . ., x£) -. u
U
«i
I = 2 , . .. , m.




2xj !> 3*} 9Xj
where
-If j and k are outputs then (5) says that the
rate at which it is technically possible to transform k
into j should be equal to the common individual relative
evaluation of the two commodities.
-If j is output and k is input, then (5^ says that
the rate at which individual weights the loss (disutility)
in providing factor services against the benefit of the
product of these services should be equal to the rate at
which it is possible to transform factor services into
commodities.

-If j and k are both inputs, then (5) says that the
rate at which factor suppliers are prepared to switch their
supplies should be equal to the rate at which it is techni-
cally possible to do so.
The first order conditions, together with the constraints
may make possible the relation
G (u\.. .,ir) --
which gives us the various welfare distributions corresponding
to the social transform function
F(X 4 . . . . ,Xj - o.
The function G will represent, in the utility space,
a surface called "the grand utility possibility surface".
For a unique solution to be possible, the social ranking
rule must be so specific as to provide us with a social





) . Then the solution for the
"grand design" can be found by solving the problem:
I Max W(U\...,Vm )
subject to
where
F I X4 ...-.,JO o
.1
1 = 1
*j " Xj iM, n
u*(x{
...... xM , trtx ' - ^ i* £ 1 , . . . , m
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The first order conditions will lead to:
vt/, u; : WS U; (6) /£,& si,.









Thus Pareto optimum conditions are necessary for the
"grand optimality".
Bator (Ref. 8) expounded the above points graphically in
a very simple and effective manner. To make his diagrammatic
presentation possible he has to limit himself to the cases of
two inputs ( L and D ) inelastically supplied, two outputs
( A and N ), and two individuals. He also made a host of
other assumptions, . some of them strong, to ensure convexity,
no externalities, smooth continuity.
Here we need only show the diagrams and relate them to
what has been shown earlier.
Figure 7 - the curves labeled A^ and A represent
different output levels for A. Similarly do N, and N? for N.
O represents the production possibility functionan
F(X-., ,#, ,X ) in the input space for this particular case.
Figure 8 - FF represents F(X_ , • • -X ) in the output space;
OP the utility possibility curve in the commodity space as










Figure 9 - PP represents the possibility curve H(U
,
•••U J )
related to production pjint P in the utility space; QQ is the
possibility curve related to the production point Q in Figure 8.
Figure 10 - GG represents the grand utility possibility
surface G(U , •**Um ) related to the production possibility
curve FF in Figure 8; Wj, W2 represents different levels
of social welfare; S is the grand optimum solution.
Now it is important to emphasize that the above results
have been obtained under the following necessary assumptions:
- Convex behavior in production and consumption
- Smoothly differentiable curves which also imply
perfect divisibility of inputs and outputs
- Tangency occurs at internal points
- No externalities
a. The internal tangency solution implies that, in the
case of production, at the optimum point each input is
required to produce every output. This is not necessarily
the case if the solution is at a corner point. This is
illustrated in Figure 11a and Figure lib; the latter shows
that:
(Marginal productivity of L\ /Marginal productivity of L \
Marginal productivity of D/A \Marginal productivity of D/N
A similar situation can happen in the exchange problem,
as is shown by Arrow, when a commodity is not necessarily
consumed by everyone. Figure 12 illustrates the situation.
b. When externalities exist, the first order conditions
















particular output or a particular individual. Instead they
reflect some "hidden" inputs or outputs, the benefits or
costs of which are not easily appropriated by market institu-
tions. A simple example was given by Meade who assumed an
economy of one single input labor resource L, with two
homogeneous and divisible goods: apples (A) and honey (H)
with production function
A = A (LA )
H = H (LH , A(LA ))
Perfect competition is assumed.
Then the apple growers and honey producers acting
independently through the competitive market would be pro-
ducing their products at such a level so that the labor wage
is W satisfying (let P^, P be the prices of apples and
honey respectively):
But efficient production for the society would demand
input allocation be so as to:
Max
Pa
A . pH H
subject to:
and wage rate at optimum would be W so that:
pH lhL -_ w. . p^A_ M.3H
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Comparing (7) and (8;, it can be seen that mi sallocation
would occur in the competitive market because of the hidden
effect of A on H.
c. The assumption about production functions and indif-
ference curves having well defined and continuous curvatures
is only necessary for the calculus technique to be used,
which is a powerful technique when it is suitable, and the
optimum conditions can be presented in a more simple and
readily explanatory fashion. Otherwise it is not essential
to the determination of the results. In a world of flat-
faced, sharp-cornered production functions and indifference
curves, linear programming would be a very effective analyti-
cal tool.
d. Increasing return to scale production can jeopardize
the convexity property and leads to trouble. The main
problem of increasing return to scale is that the optimum
decision rule would generally require the activity to be
carried out at loss when the total imputed factor incomes
will exceed the total value of output.
Now, the outputs, so far discussed, belong to the class
of privately consumed commodities. Somuelson (Ref. 9)
generalized the problem further to include the class of
collectively consumed commodities called public goods. If
X is the amount of the public good available and x, is
k k




Samuelson then formulated the problem for the case of
s individuals, n private goods, and m public goods as:
Max W (t/\...,U s )
subject to:
F.(Xi ,.,..., .X* ,X,1M) ...,XKl+rrv ) = o
where X., i = l,**«,n denotes the private goods
„ x + -, j = l,*'*,m denotes the public goods.
By making the usual assumptions so as to make it possible
for the Lagrangian technique to be used, the first order
conditions would lead to:
_± (9)
k
WV Uj * - 1 , . • , n
>t5l
TT^ \ * J. / 3 c 1,. . . , m.
ur hr r s 4 n.
All notations have the usual meanings.
(9) and (10) are the familiar results obtained previously
for private goods only, (ll) refers to the case of public
goods which says that the sum of the marginal rate of sub-
stitution in exchange between the public good (n+j) and the
private good r
,




So as not to make the discussion too long, it suffices
here to state that in an economy with money as the medium of
exchange, the efficiency conditions (not counting the public
goods case or, for that matter, externalities) will be
achieved if the following price patterns are satisfied:
1. Prices of each class of variable inputs and outputs
to be uniform over the person and production sectors
2. Prices of fixed supply and of intermediate goods
to be uniform over the production sector
3. Personal consumption patterns to be so arranged
that subjective substitution rates between goods equal their
relative prices
4. Outputs and inputs to be increased in each industry
until the price of the product equals its marginal cost.,
(Note: If all inputs supplied are inelastic then it is
only necessary that prices be proportional to marginal costs
in the same proportion.)
A more detailed discussion can be found in Millward (Ref.7)
From the above requirements, it is seen that if the
economy consists of a strictly private enterprise system,
which is purely competitive, where the firms maximize profits
and individuals maximize utilities, then the efficient
conditions would be automatically achieved. (Monopoly would
fail to behave according to the efficient conditions unless
all supplies are inelastic and the demand for the different
products exhibits the same degree of elasticity since in
38

that case all prices would be of the same proportion to the
corresponding marginal costs, hence efficient conditions
are maintained.
)
The above statement is true only if the following
abnormal cases are excluded:
a. Several consumers have bliss point lying in the
feasible set. In Figure 13, X is a Pareto optimal point;
it is a competitive equilibrium point only if A is constrained
to moves on the right of the budget line and B to the left.
This is the case only if prices are negative. ( xa> Xr are
the bliss points for A and B respectively.)
b. One consumer has a bliss point and indifference
curves contain straight line segments. In Figure 14, the
set of Pareto optimal points is the segment X R B (X is the
bliss point for B). However if the initial holding point is
X" and the budget line does not coincide with Uq
,
then X
is the competitive equilibrium point (prices are positive)
but is clearly not a Pareto optimal.
c. Some consumer is not able to trade because he holds
no unit of any commodity that is desired by other consumers
(i.e. what he owns, nobody wants). In Figure 15, B is
satiated with respect to good 1 at the point x, , the
initial joint holding is X , the set of Pareto optimum
points is X B but X is not a competitive equilibrium point
no matter what budget lines pass through X.
d. Commodities are indivisible. In Figure 16, commod-

























as "lattice-points" are feasible. Although preference
curves are defined for all values of goods 1 and 2, A and B
are only allowed to choose the lattice points in maximizing
their utilities. Thus with the budget line shown where X
o
is the initial joint holdings, the utility maximizing
holding point for A and B which is consistent with market-
clearing and feasibility is X' . However X" is Pareto
superior to X'
.
e. Externality and public good, where either there is
no way to price the product or the cost cannot be fully
appropriated.
In the case of a social ownership system, then:
- As long as there is a large number of buyers and the
market is allowed to clear, prices of outputs will be uniform
over the person sectors.
- For inputs, large numbers of buyers and sellers on
both sides of the market will ensure that all participators
are price takers. With the market clearing, the prices on
both sides are equated.
- As far as the person sector is concerned, utility
maximization will guarantee that subjective substitution
rates between goods be equal to their relative prices.
- For the production sector, it is required that the
production of each commodity be pursued up to the level
where price equals marginal cost.
In a mixed system where there are both private and
public sectors, we would essentially need the combination of
44

the above conditions where it is relevant so that both sectors
can satisfy the Pareto optimum conditions while in equilibrium,
Finally, it is worth summarizing a few main points about
Pareto optimum conditions:
- That they are only necessary conditions and by
merely operating in this condition in no way guarantees that
the ultimate social welfare is maximized.
- That they are of all-or-nothing nature, i.e. if
someone' s behavior deviates from the Pareto condition then
there is no longer any justification for others to obey this
rule. Instead the problem of resource allocation would be
approached in the manner of second best, i.e. to maximize
the social welfare subject to the additional constraint due
to the deviating behavior.
These points, coupled with the qualifications needed for
arriving at Pareto optimum and the assumption that individual
has perfect knowledge of what is best, really weaken the
significance of trying to achieve Pareto optimum as compared
with just any arbitrary behavior.
How good is it then?
This is best expressed by Mishan, and to quote him,
"...Nevertheless, though an optimum per se cannot
be vindicated as a norm to be pursued, some virtue may
be detected in the 'lower level' optima of exchange and
production
.
...Irrespective of the distribution of welfare, a
movement to or toward an exchange optimum is an
unambiguous actual improvement in the welfare of the
economy, i.e. some people will always be better-off and
none worse-off if exchange between individuals of their




.A production optimum is less reliable. A move-
ment to or toward an optimum production point is an
unambiguous potential improvement with certainty only if
it entails an increased production of at least one good
without reducing the production of another good.
...If, therefore, one disregards allocative
criteria to the extent of trespassing upon these lower
level optimum conditions, the welfare of the community
is liable to be damaged."
46

IV. PUBLIC ENTERPRISE PRICING
We have discussed previously that, subject to a set of
qualifications, Pareto efficient condition means that goods
and services should be produced up to the levels where prices
are equal to marginal costs no matter who is producing them,
private or public enterprises.
The question is why the existence of public enterprises?
The answer is public attitude toward government action,
feasibility and efficiency.
In the normal situation, where the public has trust of
their government, it is only natural that government activi-
ties in producing particular goods and services are favorably
looked upon. After all the government is, to quote A. Lincoln,
"...of the people, by the people, for the people ". It pro-
fesses to follow the objective function of maximizing social
welfare.
In underdeveloped or sometimes in developing countries,
it is usually the case that government is the only one who
can raise capital and provide the organization base to do
the job of providing certain goods and services.
When externalities exist between different activities,
private enterprises usually are not in as good a position as
public enterprises - due to the limits on the scope of their
activities - to capture the externality effect so as to come
up with the true social cost of production necessary to
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arrive at the right Pareto efficient condition. Private
enterprises would also fail to behave according to the Pareto
efficient condition where the market mechanism cannot lead
to pure competition.
In the case of public goods, for example where consump-
tion is non-excludable (e.g. defense, police), it is
impossible to establish any appropriate pricing policy,
since it is to the individual's advantage not to reveal the
real value of the consumption. Also it may be doubtful that
individual really knows how much is best for him. Thus the
demand curve cannot be established. In this case, govern-
ment is the only appropriate supplier, not only because it
is in a better position to judge the need but also because
its. objective is not in profit but in social welfare.
Even if the exclusion principle could be made to work
for consumption, the additional cost could be so large as to
make the activity very ineffective (uneconomical), or that
it is better to make the goods or services free, then again,
government is in the position to be able to do it.
When a producer's product makes up a large portion of
the market so as to allow it to manipulate the price, then
a private monopolist would normally fail to follow Pareto
efficient condition in his effort to maximize profit (except
under the very special situation mentioned previously.)
For goods classified as public utilities (electricity,
telephone, water, etc.) the economics and physical character-
istics lead to efficient operation only under monopoly
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(sometimes referred to as natural monopoly). For example,
public utilities are characterized by large investment cost
and very small operating cost giving rise to decreasing
average unit cost. This efficiency due to size would make
competition very unstable and eventually would lead to
monopoly. Also by not having to worry about competition, the
monopolist is more willing to develop bigger and more effi-
cient plants, taking advantage of technological advancement
and hence making fuller use of the contiunously decreasing
average cost characteristics. Furthermore, monopoly will
prevent duplication of facilities which is not only a waste
economically but also causes physical obstruction (e.g. power
lines, gas pipes, etc.). Another important feature of public
utility that is favorable toward monopoly is that the
commodities are, in general, non storeable. Goods and
services must be produced when the order is made, which poses
the problem that the production capacity must be large enough
and must be efficiently used. Now individual demand normally
exhibits strong fluctuations in different manners depending
on what uses are made of the commodities. By gathering all
various demands in one market, more even characteristics
can be expected from the aggregate demand which can be
better adapted to a given capacity, thus better efficiency
is obtained.
In short, whenever accurate social pricing is not-
possible, government is the only desirable producer and
whenever this pricing is possible, government may well be in
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a better position to assess the cost and being subjected to
much less financial constraint it has a better chance to
adopt the desirable pricing policy while still being able to
take advantage of any favorable characteristics related to
the activity.
This is, of course, not to say that there is no place
for private enterprises in producing goods and services.
When the conditions allow the market mechanism to operate
fairly successfully in the sense of pure competition, then
it is a fairly costless and effective mechanism to lead
activities to optimum condition no matter what types of en-
terprises are involved. Also, in aspects such as motivation
and awareness, it is often the case that they exist in much
stronger degree in the private sector than the public sector.
Next we would like to pose the question how should public
enterprises behave?
This question has been the subject of many articles by
economists. They fall in between the two "extreme" cases,
one using the social welfare function of the Samuelson type
(also called individualistic social welfare function) as the
objective for the public sector, and the other making use of
the compensation principle, with supply and demand functions
being explicitly expressed in the objective function of the
public sector.
For those using the social welfare function typified by
an article by Boiteux (Ref. 10), attempts have been made to
obtain pricing policy without the need of specifying the
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exact form of the social welfare function except for some
general properties such as:
- Smooth indifference curves so as to make calculus
analysis possible
- Social welfare is increased if one individual's
utility increases while others' remain unchanged
In other words, although the welfare function is used,
the interpretation is limited to the Pareto sense only.
In the case of Boiteux, he formulated the problem
considering an economy of n commodities (input being neg-
ative, output positive), a private sector with v producers,
a public sector with . w producers and the consumers of m
individuals
.
The consumers' behavior is formulated as:
Max IT* (Q^)
subject to: (12) k = l,...,m
PV = rk
where Q = (q ,*'*,q ) , the bundle of commodities supplied
(if negative) or consumed (if positive) by
individual k,
r = the lump sum tax (if negative) or subsidy (if
positive) on individual k,
t
P = (p, 5 • • 'P )> the price vector.
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The private enterprises are operating under pure compe-
tition. Each firm's behavior is formulated as:
Max PX X*1
subject to: (l ^) h = l,«-«,v
Ax11 ) =
where X = (x n '''x ) , the bundle of commodities used
1 n
(if negative) or produced (if positive) by the
firm h.
Each public enterprise has production function
g
1 (Y1 ) = 1 = l,...,w
and a budget constraint
pV = b 1
where Y = (v, ,...,y ) , the bundle of commodities used
1 n
(if negative) or produced (if positive) by the
enterprise 1,
1
b = the constrained profit (if positive) or deficit
(if negative)
.
The market is allowed to clear, i.e.
Boiteux expressed the social welfare function in the
form of
- W z H x k v k
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and formulated the public sector behavior as
kMax z x k u
subject to:
Consumers behavior as in 12
Private enterprises behavior as in 13
Market clearing constraint
Public enterprises production and budget constraints
Now, consumers behavior would result in U (P,r ) and
k k
q. (P,r ). Private enterprises behavior would result in
x. ( P) . Hence the above problem could be put in the form:
Waxil X K U
k (P,r k )
subject to:
-Jl«|iW>-£ *>)-£>!
















l (y l ) + Z ft (b l - pV)
1=1 L J i=i
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-\n^ \ V *\ ., k
(ij) is called the global coefficient of substitution
of goods i and j for the household and industrial con-
sumers (suppliers) taken together.
ZV = /Ci - /Cn (fo/Pn)
(§2 :-A./r»)(ft - 9^/3*)
Note: z =
n
mSince the M, ' s coefficients appear in homogeneous for




-c = (i * ?i)(p* - s! r„/3i)
Now:
1. If no budget constraint is required, Pi - O \f l
Then since the matrix t(ij)l is non-singular:





1 / 1or p - g. p / g
i ^i *n ^n
i.e. price is equal to marginal cost.
2. If there is only one global budget constraint for
the public sector
.e. b-pt Y = where Y = 21 Y
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hence slfe/S* s 3 | f^/g









q\ oS Q z. q s
TU U rt It* TC l-L
Thus all public enterprises must act as though they are
maximizing their profits with respect to the fictitious
price system j[. - (It , , . . . ,TT ) common to all of them (except
for commodity n since p = U )
.
Note that TC • = 9 • P / 9 i- s "the marginal cost o:1 1 n n
producing good i
,
but the selling price is p. where
p. - x = *.
Thus the public enterprises are operating at the output
levels where the selling prices deviate from their marginal
costs. If these deviations are not too large, in the sense
as to allow differential expressions to be used for changes
(Ramsey (Ref. 11) also stressed this point), then by viewing
t. as p. it could be shown that
l l
Zl{ij)U = E (*d>Spi -- By,
4 = 1 *=i
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Compared with (15) we have:
hi : 77^i 2 H' *'-' d *-*
Thus when the public sector is subjected to a single
global budget constraint then except for the reference
product whose price is fixed ( ]£ = p ) , all others must be
sold at prices deviated from marginal cost (or output must
be at the level such that its marginal cost deviates from
the market price) in such amounts as to cause the same
relative change - if the change is "small" - in outputs
from the optimum levels when no budget constraint is imposed
at all, provided a change in prices is accompanied by a
compensated variation in r
.





l j-s 2,s : t t . . w
j. l> J.S - . . .
*•$ tj z d *id * 4,. • • i »W
Thus except for the reference good, the relative devia-
tions between goods are the same for all public enterprises.
Define: n-i . -





Then from (l4) we have
w
(16^ is similar to (15 ) and thus for given good i
(except for the reference good) a public enterprise 1, oper-
ating under its own budget constraint, would produce at a
level such that the deviation of price from marginal cost
t. would be as in (17) where z- would be proportional to
1 i
small changes in prices causing the same relative change in
the commodities produced (consumed) by enterprise 1.
Note the important assumptions used by Boiteux to arrive
at the above results:
- Private sector is operating under pure competition
- Lump sum tax is possible (r )




In similar vein, Mohring (Ref. 12) however concentrated
his analysis on the peak load problem associated with most
public utility. He restricted the peak load problem to only
two periods, the peak period demand which he called X, , the
off-peak demand X and a third good Xo so as to allow the
problem to be viewed in the light of the total economy
without having to make it too complicated.
Mohring treated cost functions in terms of the cycle-
period outputs. Thus let o< . (i=l,2) denote the fraction of
time the demand is of type i, since the actual output is X.

if the whole period had been used to produce good i only
then x./o^. would have been produced at a cost C(X^/o(-, K)
where K is the annual cost of the public utility's capital
plant, then the operating cost of providing X- is
(X iC(Xi /o(i , K).
X~ was treated by Mohring in a very particular way. It
is a numeraire good and also its production is such that
a unit of resource services can be converted to a unit of X~
.
Thus Xo serves not only as a reference good but also as the
type of "final" outputs as seen by Lerner (e.g. leisure).
As for the consumers - in Mohring' s model, it is conven-
ient to regard the sole resource service as labour for ease
of interpretation - each can choose to work a certain amount
to pay for the consumption of goods 1 and 2 and the lump sum
tax (subsidy) and the rest of their labour resource to be
converted to leisure, namely good 3.
The consumer behavior is thus:
.
.
M^x u*uj , *; . 4)
subject to:
where r is individual labor resources, h is his head tax
(subsidy) and there are n individuals in the economy.






where f^ - YL C*1
n.
L
and W is the individualistic social welfare function.
Mohring's results are summarized as follows:
1. If no budget constraint is imposed then the conclusion
is again that the utility should operate at the point where
price and marginal cost are equal.
2. If a budget constraint is adopted and if the products
in the two periods are substitute, then price should be
greater than marginal cost in both periods (shifting effect
of demand). If they are complements then it may be the case
that price in the off-peak period may be lower than its
marginal cost.
3. For the case when it is not possible to price
differently the commodities in the periods, a single price
constraint is introduced. The result is a single price
which is a combination of the marginal costs in both periods.
In all three cases mentioned above, the optimum capacity
level would lead to the saving possible in the variable
cost due to an increase in capacity being exactly offset by
the additional cost of increasing the capacity.
59

4. For the case of single toll constraint, Mohring's
example is the road problem where the variable cost is
born by the consumer himself; the only price that the public
utility can impose on the consumers is gasoline tax. Thus
the commodity's price is of the form
fj =- -T..+ c<6 C( Xj /*j , K)/X
(d
In this case optimum capacity may result in it being
"inefficiently" small or large (by an inefficient size is
meant that the saving in the variable cost can no longer be
offset by the extra cost required to increase the capacity)
Thus, apart from studying the problem of public enter-
prises' behavior under various other types of constraint,
Mohring's approach is essentially the same as Boiteux's:
- The same general welfare function





- Input being r
- Lump sum tax (subsidy) being h
- Individuals are price takers and utility maximizers
The difference is that in Boiteux's case prices are set
by a purely competitive market mechanism and government
behavior is to influence the output levels and the associa-
ted marginal costs while manipulating the lump sum tax to
satisfy any income redistribution required by the social
welfare function, whereas in the Mohring model government
behavior is to influence output levels and the associated
prices while manipulating the lump sum tax to obtain the
60

desired income distribution. Mohring also studied the
question of optimum production capacity which is an impor-
tant aspect in public utilities analysis.
The above approach of using the Samuelson type of social
welfare function makes it necessary that the analysis be done
with models covering the whole economy with all producers
and consumers being taken into account (although they may
be assumed to consist of only a few). It is conceptually
the most appropriate and general but this is at the price of
heavy burden of mathematical derivation and manipulation.
Many neat and easily int erpretable results are possible only
due to the use of lump sum taxes giving rise to many addition-
al first order conditions aiding the mathematical manipulations
and thus results in simple formulae are obtained.
At the other extreme, some economists wanted to give the
public enterprises a much more explicit type of objective
function. To do this, the compensation principle was used
while assuming that the effect of the public enterprise
activity under consideration is totally contained within its
sphere of influence, i.e. the behavior in the economy
external to the public enterprise activity is unaffected and
vice versa. Thus the gain or loss associated with the
activity can be established without the need to enlarge the
problem to cover the whole economy.
The compensation principle, in this context, says that an
activity is favorable if there is a net gain associated with
it. Thus the objective of the public enterprise is to
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maximize this net gain. Dupuit (Ref. 13), Marshall suggested
measuring a consumer's gain as the difference between the
price he is willing to pay and the actual price paid to
acquire a unit of the product and a producer's gain as the
difference between the revenue he can collect and the cost
involved in producing that level of output. Then, assuming
also perfect divisibility, it can be seen that the net gain
excluding the fixed cost is measured as the area between
the demand and the marginal cost curves in the range of the
output being produced and that the area reaches its maximum
value when the output is at the level where the demand and
marginal cost curves intersect, i.e. where price is equal
to marginal cost. Figure 17 illustrates this point.
This view involves the assumption that the demand for the
products produced by the public enterprises are independent
of those belonging to the economy external to them, that there
is no income effect. Little (Ref. 14) and many others
showed that for the measure of willingness-to-pay to be
consistent (i.e. the same amount is obtained, irrespective
of how the consumer chooses to respond to changes in
quantity or price) then the marginal utility of money has
to be constant. Samuelson (Ref. 15) has shown that there is
no hope for the conditions - constant marginal utility of
money, independent utility contribution - to be satisfied









Proponents for the surplus approach argued that it can
be useful as good approximations. If the amount of income
involved in the consumption of the products under considera-
tion is only a small part of the total budget, then it will
not noticeably change the pattern of consumption on other
goods and hence the marginal utility of money can be
considered as constant.
Following Dupuit, one can view the net gain (or net
benefit) as a measure of gain in social welfare. In this
case more assumptions are clearly involved such as that
utility is measurable in terms of money, that everyone is
treated in the same way and that the consumption of the
products contributes its own independent amount of utility.
Johansen (Ref. 16) used such an approach in his discussion
on public activities. In this case the objective function
is again readily interpretabie as social welfare, although of
a special kind.
Alternatively, as suggested by the compensation principle,
the net gain is the net earning above variable cost that the
public suppliers can obtain if perfect discriminating pricings
are possible. This amount can then be used to recover the
fixed cost and the rest will be profit. In this circumstance,
the consumers will be indifferent but the public suppliers
will gain profits, i.e. some one could be better off and
none worse off. There is then no need to assume measurable
utility (i.e. utility is cardinal in nature) or that everyone
be treated in the same way. Thus the goal for the public
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enterprises would be to maximize the potential profit which,
when realizable, will leave every consumer indifferent.
It is important to emphasize at this point that, just
as with private enterprises in a competitive market whose
goal is to maximize profit, price being equal to marginal
cost is only a necessary condition. A private enterprise
must at least recover its total cost. In the case of public
enterprises, the net gain as defined must be bigger than
the related fixed cost to make the operation desirable. This
is relevant to such decisions as whether the public enterprise
should be established to function at all (i.e. decision to
start the activity) or whether an expansion in the activity
should be made which requires additional capital investment.
Now, originally the net benefit concept was developed
for each single product in the public sector and hence re-
quired the assumption that the demand for each product be
independent, i.e. there is no cross elasticity. Hotelling
(Ref. 17) generalized the concept to cover the case where
the products exhibit cross elasticity
,
thus need to be
considered together. The generalized consumer surplus
function is then of the form:






where p^ is the price of good i when the consumption is
bundle q = (q..,...,q ), and p* is its price when the
consumption bundle is q* = (q£ , . . . ,q* ) .
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The integrabili ty condition for the preceeding expression
requires that
7>%
the economic meaning of which is that there be no income
effect between those goods.
Pressman (Ref. 18) provided quite a typical and general
analysis of pricing policy for the public sector using the
surplus concept, although his article was mainly concerned
with the problem of peak load pricing.
Pressman considered a public utility offering its good
for the peak and off-peak demands in amounts q-i and q2
respectively, with cost functions
D
l (q i?
K) - D (q i
,K)
D
2 (V K) = ° ( q ?' K )
where K represents the utility capacity, and the capacity




1 (q 1 ,K) + D2 (q2 ,K) + q(K).
Pressman analyzed the problem with regard to two











By investigating the Kuhn- Tucker condition for ma imum
solution, he was able to derive the rollowing results:
In the general case where the demands are independent
then :
- The capacity is optimum when
2K ' 2>K 2K ^K
which is the same as Mohring's result
- If there i s no profit constraint then we obtain
the familiar result:
- Pi (<), ,0,) r ^£L ^ -. 4,Z
- If the profit constraint is imposed then
where ^n • ^
e, = -11* A . e,, - . ** ft""4
> *4




If, in addition, the goods are independent then
?> Cj*, 4 * /I 6^
'-iy
- If the capacity constraints are imposed on both
periods, then:
where • is the multiplier associated with capacity
constraint for period i.
In this case optimum capacity must be such that
Now, if there is no longer a profit constraint, i.e.
X = 0, then














Pressman also worked with a linear cost model where
: % = bcj4 , Dz -. beja , ^(k) : £K
The result of the analysis for this case can be derived
from the above general case.
By using the surplus concept for the public enterprise'
s
objective function, Pressman has been able to derive results
which are of the form given us by Mohring. They are
typically represented by (18) and (19)
.
From (19) it is interesting to note that when n o
capacity constraint exists (i.e. = 0) then the capacity
should be extended to the optimum value when the saving in
operating marginal cost ( £1 . ? ) is just offset by the
extra cost needed to acquire more capacity. This situation
is relevant to the decision of expanding the capacity by
using new plant (thus obtaining lower operating cost). This
point was discussed by Millward (Ref. 19), but in the context
of the indivisibility of extra capacity and the time dimen-
sion to cost was also accounted for and thus the result was
expressed in terms of equivalent discounted value.
When the extra capacity does not affect operating cost
(i.e. i : o, \f /i, ), for example the linear model shown
^ K
above, and that it requires some cost to have extra capacity
then 19 says that either o^ or 0^ (whichever is related
to peak period) or both cannot be zero. Thus, at least the




Consider C(q) = D(q) + q(K), where the capacity limit
is represented by K. When q = K then






dK dK ' dK (2Z)
(22) represent s the long term marginal cost, Boiteux
called it, the expansion cost.
By examining (18) , (19) , (22), it can be seen that when
there is no profit constraint ( A_ = 0) and only peak demand
is under capacity limit, the optimum limit of capacity
should be so. that the peak demand price is equal to the
expansion cost. When both period demands are subjected to
the capacity limit then their prices exceed the operating
marginal costs by their share . of the capacity cost which
Boiteux called the development cost. These results were
also obtained by Boiteux (Ref. 20) and Steiner (Ref. 21).
(18) says that, when the profit constraint exists, the
price deviation contains another component which should be
proportional to the price and ( -— + -5-). When there is no
cross elasticity (i.e. no —
•_
term) then the more inelastic
the demand the larger is the deviating component imposed by
profit constraint. When the demand is completely inelastic
then the fixed cost should be covered by this demand of the
product alone, unless other consideration is taken into
account, e.g. if the customers are poor people then it would
not be desirable to follow this policy.
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Note again that the relative smoothness i<" achieving the
above results is at the expense of making some strong assump-
tions concerning surplus analysis. When the surplus is
interpreted as a measure of net gain in social welfare then
it implies some further assumptions to be made such as that
utility is measurable in terms of money; that society weights
individual utility equally, on the other hand it removes any
ambiguity that is there in the objective function. However
by interpreting the surplus as the "potential profit" over
the variable cost, then the "improvement" due to public
sector operation is only in the sense of the compensation
principle which we have seen to contain some possible
ambiguity even in its "loose" sense on improvement (i.e.
potential improvement).
Now in between the two approaches just shown are those
represented in articles by Baumol and Bradford (Ref. 22)
and Ramsey (Ref. 23) where a particular form of social
welfare function is used which only takes into account the
aggregate consumption.
The results presented by Baumol and Bradford's analysis
can be seen in their simple general equilibrium model. Here
they proposed only one input resource, labor, and n outputs
with cost function F(x, ,...,x ) to measure the required
input resource, the social welfare function Z(p
, ...p )
where p^ i s the unit price of product i. The production of




Mau Z (p4 ,...,R,.)
subject to
n.
21 ft x* - F (
x
4 , . . . , x^ ) - M
4. = !





where A. is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the
profit constraint.
Note that by expressing the welfare function this way
and by assuming —— -
-X«i Baumol and Bradford essential].
y
assumed that the marginal social welfare of individual
income is the same for everyone, irrespective of size. Thus,
if marginal individual utility of income is the same, then










(^23 J can then be written as:
£U^t£)|*i :H*)L)*L







i (i^) 3L * x
*=i 3x^ Oft
If no cross elasticity exists then
1 3 x* 3 x*






This is the same as Pressman's result.
When the deviation p. - —— is small, then (25^ leads
SXi "- K (2 6)
which is the same as Boiteux' s result. Baumol and Bradford
claimed that (26 J holds even if cross elasticity exists and
cited Boiteux' s proof. But Boiteux had used the compensated
lump sum tax for changes in price to deduce the result in a
general context, thus their claim that (26) holds generally
is only true in this respect.
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If L is fixed, i.e. the effect of tax results in resource
reallocation within the taxed sector only then:
9Xi
and
+ A.2H = O (Z7\
i.e. it is sufficient for prices to be proportional to
marginal costs in the same proportion.
If the products concerned are of the Lerner types
(i.e. "final" outputs in the sense that leisure is also a
product) then L represents the whole economy which, in the
short run, is indeed quite inelastic, then (27) is in fact
Lerner' s statement that in the case all "final" goods can
be taxed, it is only necessary to make price in the same
proportion to its marginal cost.
Bauraol and Bradford took the view that since it is not
feasible to tax every "final" goods in the Lerner sense,
then only final goods that are in market transactions should
be considered. In this case it is true that prices being
in the same proportion to marginal costs satisfy optimum
condition only if resource reallocation occurs only within
the taxed sector.
Ramsey approached the problem in a different manner, He
used the net utility function U(x,,...,x ) which can be
viewed as a social welfare function taking into account only
of aggregate consumption (similar to Baumol, Bradford).
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When there is no profit constraint, optimum outputs should
be at a level such that
7> U
1 o A* c <±) n.
Let the optimum quantities by (x , ...,x ). The profit
constraint would then be introduced through the required
amount of revenue to be collected through tax.
R
n.





= 21 K x-c
t = l
Ramsey came up with the condition for tax optimization,
assuming constant marginal utility of income so that
3U







for A_£- "small" enough so that
Then (28) implies
Xa •«.
which is similar to Baumol, Bradford and Boiteux conclusions
For the above results to remain true for large change in
consumptions due to tax, it is sufficient that (^29) remains
true for large variation of x-j-
,
sTi^x s - ' '»
v5 ' X S
which implies that A-f is linear in x's.
Ramsey thus proposed a quadratic utility function in x's
TJ
-
Constant + E. <*r xr * H H 6^ s xr x <
n n
where Z. Z_ Pp S X«f xs is negative definite
The optimum point when no revenue is collected would
have to satisfy
— : cxr + Z l_ @rs xs ; o
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When tax /Lp is imposed then:
s-i
S = 4 &-1
which is linear in x's.
In this case the utility function is represented by
hyper-ellipsoids indifferent surfaces with the center at
(x
,
s=l,...,n) and the revenue levels by other hyper-ellips-
oids with the center at (
2
X > s=l,...,n).
Ramsey also considered the case where all commodities
are independent and have their own supply and demand curves,
thus
Then for small changes in demands, the optimum ad-valorem
tax (where A.« = /Cf °if ) should be such that
n. (50)
>x
where 6^. and Pp are elasticities of supply and demand
respectively, defined so that they are both positive.
From (^30), if any commodity is completely inelastic,
either in demand or supply or both, then the whole revenue
should be collected on it. A result similar to other author's
findings mentioned before.
When all commodities have independent demands but are
complete substitutes in supply,
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i.e. pr -. pr (Xr )
then (30) becomes
A + JL i. + JL " i. + JL
when the supply is inelastic (i.e. 6 —s* O) then •—- « — for
all i and the ad valorem tax is the same for every good,
as might be expected.
Different approaches to the problem of resource alloca-
tion in the public enterprise activities have been presented.
We have seen that while the use of the Samuelson type of
social welfare function as the objective function for the
public sector is the most satisfying approach conceptually,
it makes the analysis much more involved and, unless lump
sum tax is assumed to take care of the income distribution
problem, the results cannot be reduced to a readily interpret-
able form. To a lesser extent, the type of social welfare
function that depends upon the aggregate consumption only
helps to reduce the large number of variables involved.
Furthermore, since this type of social welfare does not take
into account individual consumption per se, it implies that
marginal social welfare with respect to individual income is
the same for all of them, irrespective of size. The analysis
is then much simpler and the results are more readily
interpretable. For both approaches, the framework is smooth
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continuity and perfect divisibility. If an indivisibility
is involved then the analytical tool will have to be mathe-
matical programming, in which case the objective function
would have to be completely specified. This is a complex
task and so far it does not appear feasible to do so.
In contrast, the surplus concept allows the objective
function to be expressed in terms of supply and demand
functions which are intimately related to the activity under
consideration. To make the most of this type of objective
function one will normally restrict the analysis to the
enterprises concerned. This is tantamount to the assumption
that there be no externality between the enterprises and the
economy external to them, otherwise the solution would only
be the case of sub-optimization.
With regard to the objective function thus formulated, if
it is interpreted as a measure of social utility, then
social consideration for the individual is neutral, at least
within the sphere of the enterprises activities. On the other
hand, if it is interpreted as "potential profit" then it
inherits the ambiguity of the compensation principle as a
criterion for judging social welfare. Either way, this
approach has helped to simplify the analysis a great deal.
Indivisibility in this case can be dealt with in a much
simpler manner. Essentially it involves the requirement that
the extra benefit obtained be at least as large as the
extra cost. Even in the case of a government project where
no market transaction exists (e.g. a public good such as
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defense), it makes the job of evaluating the project feasible
in the form of cost-benefit analysis. Naturally, one would
expect that, in this case, a lot more relevant aspects may
not be quantifiable or assumed away and hence a lot more
uncertainty is associated with the analysis.
This is probably the reason why, despite Samuelson's
view that the concept is "worse than useless", it is still
a very popular tool, and with regard to feasibility, sometimes
the only tool available. The Samuelson judgement is a little
harsh because of his impatience with the fact that there is
no hope that the strong assumptions required by the surplus
concept can be completely satisfied, especially, the relevance
of the concept to the ultimate requirement of the social
welfare function.
Most economists would agree that, provided the enterprises
activities form only a small part of the total economy and
that externalities if they exist are small then the surplus
concept does reflect the approximate gain in the context of
the approach outlook.
We have seen that Pareto optimal conditions can only be
achieved if there is no constraint whatsoever on public
enterprises activities. In this case they would generally
have to operate on a deficit in view of the fact that most
public enterprises activities normally exhibit increasing
return (e.e. public utility). To cover the loss, taxation
has been looked upon as a possible solution, but unless the
tax is of the lump sum type or that every good can be taxed,
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its imposition would distort the price system and Pareto
conditions can no longer be achieved. Unfortunately, the
two types of tax mentioned above are not feasible.
The other alternative is to incorporate the profit
constraint in the analysis and hence the pricing policy is
formulated in a second best approach. The solution, as
expected, would be prices different from marginal costs.
This price system would satisfy the constraint and causes the
otherwise optimal welfare to be reduced by the least amount
possible. Hence the terms "second best" or "quasi optimal"
being used to refer to this type of solution.
There are other possible constraints such as capacity,
a single price, an upper limit to prices, etc. They arise
either due to some peculiarity or practical difficulty
related to the activity itself or due to an attempt to
translate certain government policy into constraints. With
regard to the latter point, it may be worthwhile to study the
possibility of formulating government policy into constraints
and thus reduce the pressure on specifying the objective
function. The alternative is to introduce these aspects
into the objective function itself. Felstein (Ref. 24)
formulated the population income distribution into the
objective function, using the surplus concept, so that the
resource allocation would be done with income distribution
taken into account. Although what he did is still a very
simplistic representation of a social welfare function, the
difficulty in interpreting the result is fairly obvious.
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In this respect, computer programming would seem to
offer much more opportunity as an analytical tool not only
because the objective functions and others can be much more
easily formulated, not being restricted to the form that would
allow calculus analysis possible, but also because of its
speed, storage and flexibility that permit the handling of
a large number of parameters and variables, and the effect





From parts III and IV, it is seen that subject to some
qualifications (no externalities, divisibilities, etc.) and
if no profit constraint is imposed then the optimum pricing
policy for the public enterprises is indeed operating at the
point where equilibrium of supply and demand brings about
price equal to marginal cost.
It is seen that this policy is quite neutral toward
income distribution. For social welfare functions that
require income redistribution to obtain the grand optimum,
analyses have been done assuming the lump sum tax for this
purpose.
Next, the rigid capacity constraint would result in
price deviating from marginal cost. It has been shown that
the optimum rigid capacity would be so as those demands
constrained by the capacity limit would have to share the
capacity cost. The extent of sharing depends on the corres-
ponding demand elasticity. However, if the rigid capacity
case is considered as the limit case of a fixed size opera-
tion (short-run) then the analyses show that the results
could still be considered as prices being equal to marginal
cost
.
Other constraints such as profit, single price, price




It is important to emphasize that the analyses and their
conclusions have been made assuming:
- Continuously differentiable indifferent curves,
- Perfect divisibility of plant size and commodities,
- Continuous and known fixed demand and supply curves,
- No joint production (to allow partial derivatives).
In other words, the analyses are static ones with the
divisibility assumption only approximately followed if the
demand is large compared to plant sizes. The limiting case
is in pure competition where the demand is so large (completely
elastic) as to become a horizontal line, then indivisibility
is no longer a problem.
It can be seen from the underlying assumptions that even
if it is possible to operate under no constraint whatsoever,
marginal cost pricing would still face a great deal of
difficulty in being carried out in practice. The indivisi-
bility of capacity results in the "additional unit" of
capacity to be able to bring about more than an "additional
unit" of output. Thus if the marginal cost concept is
practiced rigidly, the cost of acquiring the "additional
unit" of capacity will not be taken into account, only the
operating cost would be considered instead. A way of facing
this problem is to consider the product produced under
different circumstances (when, where, how and even to whom
they are produced) as being different products. For example
the products produced at peak and off-peak periods are
considered different, the fixed cost incurred by the
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additional capacity, to satisfy peak demand period only, is
considered as the cost involved in producing the product at
peak period. Thus it is important to know enough about the
cost picture to allow proper cost allocation.
The case of the by-product (joint production) makes it
particularly difficult for cost allocation, in the sense
that the partial derivative to evaluate marginal cost for
product i requires all others to remain constant which
cannot be satisfied in this situation. It will therefore
be only possible to define the marginal cost for the combined
output (x. , x.). Other considerations, based on market
conditions, that is to say on the demand curves, must be
resorted to for individual price determination. For
example, consider the simple case of an activity to produce
S resulting in two products W and M being available,
where W = k S and M = k S.









= P2 ( k2S)
The cost incurred is C(S).
Then using the surplus concept, the pricing problem
would be formulated as:
Miax.
(
(ftdvv t p2 dyi) - C(sM
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The solution would be:
Thus pj and p can only be determined individually with
the help of the demand curves.
This case besides, perhaps the hardest thing about
evaluating marginal cost is the problem of demand fluctuation
with time. It forces the issue of long run planning, of
predicting demand behavior which can only be done with some
amount of uncertainty, which can be quite considerable, and
hence uncertainty about the marginal cost.
Other difficulties related to the determination of
marginal cost were pointed out by Dessus (Ref. 25) such as
the effect of the time element (e.g., the rate of output
production) of the entrepreneurial decisions determining the
pattern of the activity and hence the marginal cost. These
points are relevant but not as strong as those previously
mentioned, in the sense that they do not pose as much of a
problem either because the effect may be weak or, as in
the case of entrepreneurial decision, once it is made the
effect is given and is no longer relevant to the determina-
tion of marginal cost.
All this is of course in addition to the externality
problem. By this is meant not only the externality on the
economy outside the enterprises activities, but also the
"externality" due to the way allocation of fixed cost on
"different products", say peak demand product. For example
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in electric power supply if extra transmission line is used
because of heavy load requirement then marginal transmission
cost is reduced for all, but the fixed cost of the trans-
mission line would be carried only by peak load demand. This
fact results in some form of subsidy.
Further difficulty related to marginal cost pricing is
encountered in the development of a tariff structure. As
would be expected, the main source of difficulty is in
fixed cost allocation.
It has been mentioned previously that fixed cost is
dealt with discriminating Mthe product". Economically, the
output of an enterprise can be considered as composed of
many different products with different cost functions. Hence
the crucial part of marginal cost pricing is in being able
to relate to the share in the fixed cost to "the products".
Of course the proportional cost (or operating cost) may also
change with "different products" but this fact presents no
problem due to its unambiguous way of occuring (except for
the joint-product situation mentioned above).
This discrimination of "the products", if carried to
the detail, would result in an extremely complex tariff
structure necessary to determine the prices for an enormous
number of products resulting from all possible combinations
of time, places, product characteristics, customers. One
only needs to think of the cost involved in establishing
this tariff structure, assuming it is possible to do so, to
realize that the procedure is forbidden. In practice, one
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has to look for a way of simplifying this complex task by
investigating the possibility of using a limited number of
parameters to reflect the occurrence of cost. It is
important, in this case, to be able to distinguish between
the essential parameters, which will appear explicitly in
the tariff, and the secondary parameters whose influence
will be lumped together in an averaging process. Boiteux
and Stasi (Ref . 26) have stressed the necessity to allow for
the special cases where the secondary parameters can have
an essential role because of the unusual characteristics
involved. Thus to quote them, "...after studying tariffs
which are valid for the majority of normal customers, some
of the averaging (equalization) will have to be re-examined.
Special tariff arrangement will have to be made for excep-
tional customers."
In the "Tariff Vert", developed for Electricite de France
(EDF), the energy has been differentiated based on regions,
seasons, times of day and the voltages at which the energy
is supplied.
As far as fixed cost is concerned, in the case of EDF
as discussed by Boiteux (Ref. 26, 27), it is determined in
its relevance to three zones: the collective, semi-individ-
ual and individual zones.
1. Capacity in the individual zone is directly deter-
mined by the personal peak of the customer and hence the
individual should pay the entire charge.
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2. In the semi-individual zone, the capacity depends on
the uncertain behavior of each individual sharing it. This
uncertainty is considered in two aspects:
- The individual variability in consumption,
- The relation of this variability to the collective
peak period.
Larger capacity will have to be acquired to support
larger variability in consumption, this requirement being
more likely the greater if the increase in consumption
coincides with the collective peak period. Furthermore,
large maximum power demands are relatively less irregular
than small demands.
In view of the above observations, and the feasibility
reason, it is decided to differentiate the fixed charge
according to the level of the contracted power demand, and a
degression of the rate of fixed charge as a function of
power demand has to be decided upon.
Thus the power contracted for at the peak is invoiced at
full rate, and the possible supplements contracted for in
the sequence of tariff positions remains (ranked in the
order of Full Use Hours in Winter, Full Use Hours in Summer,
Slack Hours in Winter, Slack Hours in Summer) at progressively
lower rate.
3. In the collective zone, the law of large number
takes its effect and averages out individual irregularities.
Thus the capacity is essentially determined by the average
consumption by the customers at the time of the collective
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peak. The related parameter is thus, not the contracted
power demand but the energy demand. Thus the fixed cost in
this zone is converted to energy cost.
It is also important to consider the shifting effect
due to differential energy pricing. It should be so as to
flatten the upper level of the demand at the capacity. In
the case of EDF, a tariff structure with three hourly
positions is capable of providing a fair approximation to
the theoretical solution. They are namely: the Peak KWH in
Winter, the Full Use KWH in Winter and the Full Use KWH in
Summer
.
It is thus clearly an effort to construct the true cost
function for the "different products". It illustrates the
point that fixed costs enter into production functions in
different ways as related to the consumer, his pattern of
power demand and his pattern of energy consumption. It also
shows that the level of detail of cost analysis has to be
limited somewhere for feasibility, and at that p^int an
average process (referred to as equalization by French
authors) is used to provide the approximation.
We have seen that even if it is possible to price
products according to their marginal costs, the practice has
a lot of inherent difficulties (dynamic nature, indivisibil-
ity, externality, joint product) as well as those due to
feasibility considerations (the desirability of a well-
stable price system, of a simple and comprehensive tariff
structure) which result in the price system being essentially
90

an approximation of the true one. In reality marginal cost
for public enterprises generally incurs a deficit. With
regard to this problem, many approaches have been suggested.
One is to recover the deficit by collecting taxes but, as
has been pointed out, feasible tax measures will result in a
distortion of the price system which removes any justifica-
tion in pricing according to marginal cost. Another approach
is to attempt "customer-discrimination 1 ' according to their
willingness to pay for the subjective value of service, but
this would result in misjudgement on the part of the consum-
ers with respect to resource allocation since the prices
they are faced with are generally not true social marginal
cost. Still another approach is the "second-best" which
recognizes the recovery of a deficit as a constraint and
finds out how price should deviate from marginal cost so as
to diminish the social welfare by the least amount. It is
clear that all these approaches result in loss of welfare;
which one is better cannot be determined until the welfare
function is completely specified.
One argument for the "second best" approach is that it
provides a better criterion to guide and evaluate the
activity in its capability of self-supporting and allows some
degree of autonomy. Furthermore, tax collection generally
tends to arouse opposition due to its psychological implica-
tion and thus may be politically undesirable.
Other factors that generally cause prices to be different
from marginal costs are those considerations which are of
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political and social natures. These are essential in any
social function and generally result in some group of indi-
viduals being subsidized.
In summary, as long as economic efficiency, in the sense
that the aggregate production be on the society production
forntier, is the only consideration in social welfare,
marginal cost pricing will lead to an optimum solution. But
this implies the acceptance of the present income distribu-
tion. When political and sociological factors are also taken
into account, which generally require income redistribution.
In this case, if lump sum or all final goods taxes cannot be
applied, then the income redistribution can only be done at
the expense of economic efficiency and therefore the relative
weights of these factors must be considered on the decision
of this type.
Even if the condition is favorable toward marginal cost
pricing, in practice it is difficult to imagine the marginal
cost rule being followed by everyone. This is due to the
problems of cost awareness or self-interest and other prac-
tical difficulties already discussed. In this case marginal
cost pricing is only an attempt to sub-optimize. Within
this context, a good pricing policy can only be the result
of careful investment planning for the long run so as to be
able to deal with the dynamic characteristics of demand and
the problem of indivisibility. It is not an easy task and
depends very much on each particular activity with its own
peculiarity and economic characteristics. Any attempt to
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generalize a specific tariff structure for all activities
is bound to be either oversimplified or irrelevant in some
aspects. The result would be resource misallocation
.
It is emphasized again that with respect to marginal
cost pricing, the key word is economic efficiency. In the
ultimate evaluation of welfare when more than just economic
factors are taken into account, marginal cost pricing cannot
guarantee an optimum solution unless income redistribution
can be carried out in a manner independent of economic
consideration by the special types of tax mentioned. Beyond
this, nothing can be said about any pricing policy.
As a general rule, however, marginal cost pricing can
serve as a useful guidance under circumstances where the
question of economic efficiency predominates. When this is
not the case, it is still a good idea to construct the
marginal cost component, and thus account for the economic
efficiency, as far as feasibility allows, while the other
component in the price structure is to reflect factors such





1. Ruggles, N., "Welfare Basis of Marginal Cost Pricing




2. Mishan, E.J., Wel fare Ecomonics: Five Introductory
Essays
,
Random House, New York, 1967.
3. Arrow, K.J., Social Choice and Individual Values , John
Wiley & Sons, Inc., New'Vork, 1951.
4. Kaldor, N., "Welfare Propositions of Economics and
Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility", Economic
Journal, Vol. LXIX, 1939.
5. Scitovsky, T. , "A Note on Welfare Propositions in
Economics", Review of Economic Studie s, Vol. IX,
1941-42.
6. Samuelson, P.A., "Evaluation of Real National Income",
Oxford Economic Papers
,
Vol. 2, No. 1, 1950.








9. Samuelson, P.A., "The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure",
Review of Economics and Statistic s, Vol. 36, Nov, 1954,
10. Boiteux, M.,"Sur la Gestion des Monopoles Publics
Astreints a 1'equilibre Budgetaire", Econometrica
,
January, 1956, 24.




12. Mohring, H., "The Peak Load Problem with Increasing




13. Dupuit, J., "Public Works and the Consumer", Transport,
Edited by D. Munby , Penguin Modern Economics, 1968.
14. Little, I.M.D., A Critique of We lfare Economic s, Oxford
University Press, I960, Chapter X.




16. Johansen, L., Public Economics, Rand McNally, Chicago,
1965.
17. Hotelling, H. , "The General Welfare in Relation to
Problems of Taxation and of Railway and Utility Rates",
Econometric a , Vol. 6, July, 1938.
18. Pressman, I., "A Mathematical formulation of the Peak
Load Pricing Problem", The Bell Journal of Economics
and Management Science
,
Autumn 1970, Vol. 1, No. 2.




20. Boiteux, M. , "Peak Load Pricing", Journal of Business
,
Vol. 33, 1960.
21. Steiner, P.O., "Peak Loads and Efficient Pricing"
Quarterly Journal of Economics
,
Nov. 1957, 71.
22. Baumol, W.J. and Bradford, D.F. , "Optimal Departures








24. Felstein, M.S., "Distributional Equity and the Optimal
Structure of Public Prices", American Economic Review,
March:, . 1972.
25. Dessus, G. , "The General Principle of Rate-fixing in




26. Boiteux, M. , and Stasi, P* , "The determination of costs
of expansion of an interconnected system of production
and distribution of electricity", Marginal Cost
Pricing in Practic e, Ed. J.R. Nelson, Prentice Hall,
1964.
27. Boiteux, M.,"The 'Tariff Vert' of Electricite de France",








1. Library, Code 0212 2
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940
2. CDTC-V, 4A Ben Bach Dang 2
Saigon - South of Viet Nam
3. Assistant Prof. K. Terasawa, Code 55 Tr 1




4. Assistant Prof. D. Whipple, Code 55 Wp 1




5. T. T. Dzinh 1
315/l7A Truong Minh Giang
Saigon - South of Viet Nam





SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (Whan Detm Entered)
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGt.!
1. REPORT NUMBER 2. GOVT ACCESSION NO.
READ INSTRUCTIONS
BEFORE COMPLETING FORM
3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER
4. TITLE (end Subtitle)
Public Enterprises Resource
Allocation
S. TYPE OF REPORT A PERIOD COVERED
Masters Thesis;
September 1973
6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER
7. AUTHORfs)
Truong Tuan Dzinh
8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBERfa)
9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940
10. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASK
AREA 6 WORK UNIT NUMBERS





13. NUMBER OF PAGES
14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME ft ADDRESSf*/ different from Controlling Office) IS. SECURITY CLASS, (of this report)
Unc 1 a ssi fi ed
ISt. DE CLASSIFICATION/DOWN GRADING
SCHEDULE
16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of this Report)
Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.
17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the ebetract entered h\ Block 20, If different from Report)
18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES





20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reveree aide If necettaory tmd Identity by block number)
A great deal of controversy has arisen with regard to
the practice of marginal cost pricing as a public sector
policy to achieve efficient resource allocation. It is
important to present the different aspects of this very
complex problem together to establish a more clarified
aggregate picture.
DD 1 JAN^73 1473 EDITION OF 1 NOV 65 IS OBSOLETE
(PagC 1) S/N 0102-014- 6601 |
97
SECURITY CLARIFICATION OF THIS PAGE fKTion Date Entered)

4~L C U Ki T Y CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGCrH/iKn Data Eitfrod)
Marginal cost pricing is faced with three main sources
of problems
:
1. That of measurement, due to both theoretical and
practical difficulties in establishing cost,
2. That of determination of social welfare, a very
complex task involving not only economic factors but also
those of politics, psychology, sociology and hence not
easily justified in a clear-cut manner,
3. That of income redistribution, which generally
occurs with the achievement of the optimal social welfare
in its ultimate form.
DD Form 1473 (BACK)
1 Jan 73





























3 2768 000 98604 6
DUDLEY KNOX LIBRARY
